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Abstract 
 
This article critiques the impact of the European Convention on Human Rights, as 
interpreted in the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court, on the criminal trial jury. It 
argues that thus far the Convention has had a limited effect on jury trial, and that the 
Court tends to proceed with undue caution when confronted with issues affecting the 
key attributes of this mode of trial. It further argues that this caution may be 
influenced by non-legal considerations which should have no place in human rights 
adjudication.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights enumerates the 
requirements of a fair trial but does not stipulate any specific process for their 
achievement. Jury trial, ‘the defining institution of the English common law,’1  is not 
                                                          
* Lecturer in Law, Durham Law School. The author wishes to thank Conor Noonan and the 
anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.  
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mentioned. This is not surprising, when one reflects on the multifarious trial 
procedures which existed in the states which were the first signatories of the 
Convention.2 Variation in criminal processes among parties to the Convention has 
increased as further states have signed and ratified the document.  One might have 
thought that the British government would have sought the inclusion of ‘that revered 
...institution, the jury’3 at the drafting stage, in the same way that the Irish 
government lobbied, albeit unsuccessfully, for a reference to ‘Christian civilisation’ in 
the text.4 However, no jury-related overtures were made by the United Kingdom 
delegation.5 As Dickson points out, the inclusion of jury trial would have been 
complicated even in the context of that jurisdiction alone, because ‘the vast majority 
of criminal offences were…then, as they still are, tried in magistrates’ courts without 
a jury.’6 A wording which would have explicitly embraced the divergences in criminal 
procedure among the signatories would have been inelegant, and any formula which 
appeared to favour one sort of system over another would have alienated states with 
other systems. Such approaches would also have hindered the future development 
of the Convention by tying its fair trial guarantee to particular types of procedures 
rather than to core values which could be pursued by a variety of means. In relation 
to mode of trial, the wording of Article 6 struck the note desired of the entire 
Convention by the drafters, namely that of underlining ‘unity rather than diversity.’7 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1
 Langbein, ‘Bifurcation and the Bench: The Influence of the Jury on English Conceptions of the 
Judiciary’ in Brand and Getzler (eds), Judges and Judging in the History of the Common Law and 
Civil Law: From Antiquity to Modern Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 67 at 67.  
2
 The first signatories of the Convention, on 4 November 1950, were Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, the United Kingdom, West 
Germany and Saar (incorporated into the Federal Republic of Germany on 1 January 1957). Greece 
and Sweden signed the Convention on 28 November 1950. Of these countries, Luxembourg, Turkey 
and the Netherlands had no jury system; Belgium, Ireland and the United Kingdom had entirely lay 
juries; Norway had both a collaborative system and an entirely lay system (the latter for serious 
appeals) and the remaining States had collaborative jury systems with panels composed of both lay 
jurors and professional judges. It is possible to draw further distinctions between the jury systems of 
the Convention states; compare the approach of the European Court of Human Rights in Taxquet v 
Belgium (2012) 54 EHRR 26 with that of the authors in Jackson and Kovalev, ‘Lay Adjudication and 
Human Rights in Europe’ (2006) 13 The Columbia Journal of European Law 83.  
3
 Mulholland, ‘Introduction’ in Mulholland and Pullan (eds), Judicial Tribunals in England and Europe, 
1200-1700 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003) 1 at 10.  
4
 Schabas, ‘Ireland, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Personal Contribution of 
Seán MacBride’ in Morison, McEvoy and Anthony (eds), Judges, Transition and Human Rights 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 251 at 256. 
5
 Dickson, The European Convention on Human Rights and the Conflict in Northern Ireland (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010) at 206. 
6
 Ibid.  
7
 Schabas, supra n 4, at 256. For a detailed account of the drafting and development of the 
Convention, see Bates, The Evolution of the European Convention of Human Rights: From Its 
3 
 
 
In spite of this historical background, applicants have argued that jury trial is 
enshrined in the Convention. In X and Y v Ireland,8 the applicants’ complaints, some 
of which related to their trial before the non-jury Special Criminal Court, were 
declared inadmissible by the Commission. In relation to mode of trial, the 
Commission stated: ‘Article 6 does not specify trial by jury as one of the elements of 
a fair hearing in the determination of a criminal trial.’9 The Commission reiterated this 
position in the subsequent case of Callaghan v United Kingdom10 where the 
applicants argued unsuccessfully that new evidence which emerged after they had 
been convicted of murder should have been aired in a retrial before a jury rather than 
before the Court of Appeal.  
 
The objective of this article is to critique and analyse the major decisions of the 
Strasbourg court touching on jury trial issues.  It will do this under thematic headings, 
as the issues which arise are diverse and not suited to chronological treatment. 
Having conducted this analysis of seminal cases, the article will attempt to discern 
an overall approach and attitude of the Court to the traditional common law jury.  
 
2. Jury impartiality 
 
Impartiality constitutes one of the elements of the fair trial guaranteed by Art 6, and it 
is this aspect of jury trial on which decisions of the Strasbourg court have arguably 
had the most impact. As will be seen presently, the Court has intervened in this area 
in respect of intolerant statements by jurors, inappropriate interactions with non-
jurors, and jury composition. The Court has consistently held that in order to comply 
with Art 6, a decision-maker must be impartial from both a subjective and objective 
perspective.11  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Inception to the Creation of a Permanent Court of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010). See also Bates, ‘The Birth of the European Convention on Human Rights – and the European 
Court of Human Rights’ in Christofferson and Rask Madsen (eds), The European Court of Human 
Rights: Between Law and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 17.  
8
 Application No 8299/78, Admissibility, 10 October 1980.  
9
 Ibid. at para 19.  
10
 Application No 14739/89, Admissibility, 9 May 1989.  
11
 See, for example, Hauschildt v Denmark A 154 (1989); 12 EHRR 266.   
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Applicants who have argued that the Convention entitles them to a role in choosing 
the jury which will try them have not met with success. The Court has held that Art 6 
does not entitle an accused person to a role in jury selection.12  In America the 
process of voir dire, in which questions are put to prospective jurors about their 
opinions and exposure to media reporting, is credited with helping to reduce juror 
bias.13 In Zarouali v Belgium,14 however, the Commission declared inadmissible a 
complaint that the applicant’s trial breached Art 6(1) because he was not permitted to 
investigate ‘the political, religious and moral beliefs of the prospective jurors.’15 The 
Commission emphasised in particular the oath taken by jurors to try the case 
objectively. It is certain that if the Court were ever to find that Article 6 required a 
procedure akin to the American voir dire, it would be very controversial in 
jurisdictions such as England and Wales and Ireland, which historically have not 
endorsed such measures.16 In the pages which follow the impact of the Strasbourg 
court’s case-law on jury impartiality will be analysed under discrete heads.  
 
A. Juror Racism 
 
Cases on racist comments by jurors were the Court’s first significant foray into the 
world of the common law jury. The applicant in Gregory v United Kingdom17 was 
black. During jury deliberations at his trial for robbery, a juror passed a note to the 
judge stating that other jurors were being racist. In response, the trial judge called 
the jurors before him and reminded them of their duty to try the accused on the basis 
of the evidence, putting aside any bias. He did not mention racial bias specifically. 
The jury convicted the applicant by majority verdict of 10:2. The Court of Appeal 
                                                          
12
 Kremzow v Austria Application no 12350/86, Admissibility, 5 September 1990. 
13
 The voir dire is deeply embedded as a means of ensuring the accused is tried by the “impartial jury” 
referred to in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Voir dire procedure differs 
significantly between the States, for example, in whether it is conducted by the advocates or the 
judge, or both, and in terms of the means employed to do it (oral questioning or written questionnaire, 
for instance). See Mize, Hannaford-Agor and Waters, The State of the States Survey of Jury 
Improvement Efforts: A Compendium Report (National Center for State Courts, 2007), available at: 
http://www.ncsc-jurystudies.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CJS/SOS/SOSCompendiumFinal.ashx  
[last accessed 21 October 2013].  
14
 (1994) 78-B DR 97. 
15
 Ibid. at 106. 
16
 For judicial reference to the English position, see R v Cornwall [2009] EWCA Crim 2458 at para 
[24], per Leveson LJ. The Irish authorities on this point are People (AG) v Lehman (No 2) [1947] IR 
137 and People (DPP) v Haugh [2000] 1 IR 184. 
17
 1997-I (1998); 25 EHRR 577. 
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refused the applicant leave to appeal, stating that while one juror had expressed 
unacceptable views there was no reason to suppose that he could not try the case 
impartially. The Strasbourg court focused on the positive effects of ‘a carefully 
worded redirection to the jury.’18 Somewhat dubiously, the Court also relied on the 
fact that no complaints of further racism were made after the redirection, deducing 
from this that it must have been effective. The Court distinguished the case from 
Remli v France,19 in which it had found a breach of Art 6(1). In that case the trial 
judge refused to investigate an allegation that a juror made a racist remark on the 
basis that the complaint related to a time before the trial had begun. By contrast, the 
judge in Gregory ‘took sufficient steps to check that the court was established as an 
impartial tribunal within the meaning of Article 6(1) of the Convention.’20 
 
In Sander v United Kingdom21 the applicant was an Asian man on trial for 
conspiracy to defraud. A juror sent a note to the judge indicating that at least 
two other jurors were making racist comments and jokes. In language similar 
to that used by the judge in Gregory, the judge reminded the jury of its 
obligation to return a verdict in accordance with the evidence, unaffected by 
prejudice. Subsequent to the redirection one of the jurors sent a note to the 
judge apologising for making racist jokes and denying racial bias. The jury 
convicted the applicant but acquitted a co-accused who was also Asian. The 
Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal, agreeing with the trial judge’s 
assessment that the test of a real risk of bias, derived from the case of R v 
Gough,22 was not satisfied.  In marked contrast to its approach in Gregory, the 
Strasbourg court doubted the efficacy of redirecting the jury to come to a 
verdict unaffected by bias: 
 
[I]n the present case the Court is not prepared to attach very much weight to 
the judge's redirection of the jury. The Court considers that, generally 
                                                          
18
 Ibid. at 595.  
19
 1996-II; 22 EHRR 253.  
20
 Supra n 17 at 595. 
21
 2000-V; 31 EHRR 44 1003. 
22
 [1993] AC 646. Gough no longer represents the English test for apprehended bias. In Porter v 
Magill [2001] UKHL 67; [2002] 2 AC 357 the House of Lords held that the test should be changed to 
the reasonable observer’s perception of bias.  
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speaking, an admonition or direction by a judge, however clear, detailed and 
forceful, would not change racist views overnight. Although in the present 
case it cannot be assumed that such views were indeed held by one or more 
jurors, it has been established that at least one juror had been making racist 
comments. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the direction 
given by the judge to the jury could not dispel the reasonable impression and 
fear of a lack of impartiality, which were based on the original note.23 
 
Finding a breach of Art 6(1), the Court strongly implied that the jury in Sander should 
have been discharged. Sander could be distinguished from Gregory, according to 
the Court, on the basis that there was no admission of racist comments in Gregory. 
The implication that a confession by a juror is required before a conviction can be 
quashed on the ground of apprehended racial bias is out of step with the concept of 
objective bias. It is also unsatisfactory to predicate the availability of a remedy on 
admissions of wrongdoing by the jurors concerned. Lord Hope has commented that 
the decisions in Gregory and Sander do not ‘sit easily with each other on the facts.’24 
One attempt to reconcile the cases argues that Sander illustrates the ineffectiveness 
ascribed by the Strasbourg court to a direction to disregard, at least where prejudicial 
comments are ‘clear, precise and substantiated.’25 It is unclear whether the only 
solution to a Sander-type scenario is to discharge the jury, or whether there are other 
solutions open to the judge under the Convention.26  
 
Several cases alleging juror racial bias have come before the English appellate 
courts since the decisions in Gregory and Sander.27 Many of these have a similar 
factual matrix to those cases, namely a communication from an individual juror 
stating that others are being racist. The decision in Gregory has been cited by the 
Court of Appeal as authority for the proposition that ‘vague and imprecise’28 
                                                          
23
 Supra n 21 at 1010.  
24
 R v Mirza [2004] UKHL 2; [2004] 1 AC 1118 at 1161. 
25
 Quinn, ‘Jury Bias and the European Convention on Human Rights: A Well-kept Secret?’ [2004] 
Criminal Law Review 998 at 1003. See also Daly and Pattenden, ‘Racial Bias and the English 
Criminal Trial’ (2005) Cambridge Law Journal 678.  
26
 Robertshaw, ‘Responding to Bias Amongst Jurors’ (2002) 66(1) Journal of Criminal Law 84 at 94.  
27
 See, for example, R v Momodou [2005] EWCA Crim 177; [2005] 2 All ER 571 and R v Heward 
[2012] EWCA Crim 890.  
28
 R v Budai [2011] EWCA Crim 186 at para 37, per Leveson LJ.  
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comments of a racist nature which come to light during the trial do not imperil a 
resulting conviction. In R v Budai29 the Court upheld a conviction where one juror ran 
from the jury room in distress at a racist remark. Leveson LJ emphasised the fact 
that the juror who made the remark wrote to the judge the next day, describing it as 
uncharacteristic and stating that it had not been made in respect of the appellants or 
any aspect of the case. The Court of Appeal has also made it clear that a warning to 
the jury to cast aside prejudice and decide the case on the evidence may be the 
appropriate response to a complaint of bias by a jury member, at least where the 
facts are closer to Gregory than to Sander.30 It is arguable that Budai is closer to 
Sander than Gregory, however, as the juror who made the racist remark admitted 
doing so.  
 
Before leaving the cases of Sander and Gregory it is worth noting that those 
decisions would appear to be equally applicable to prejudicial statements by jurors 
on grounds other than race, for example if a juror made a homophobic remark about 
the accused or implied that she should be convicted on the basis of socio-economic 
or regional stereotyping.   
 
B. Jurors with Links to the Case 
 
The right to an impartial trial under Article 6 may also be imperilled in situations 
where a juror has an interest in the outcome of a case, knowledge of its particulars in 
advance of trial or links with the accused or other parties to the case. The latter issue 
arose in Holm v Sweden.31 The applicant was the subject of a number of statements 
which alleged that he was a member of neo-Nazi groups. The book in which these 
claims appeared was published by a company owned by a left-wing political party, 
the SAP. The question of whether a criminal defamation had occurred fell to be 
decided by a jury. Of the nine jurors which decided this issue, five were members of 
the SAP. The jury found against the applicant and he argued that its composition 
meant that it was not objectively impartial. He succeeded both before the European 
Commission on Human Rights and the Court. The Court emphasised the political 
                                                          
29
 [2011] EWCA Crim 186.  
30
 R v Hussain [2005] EWCA Crim 2691. 
31
 A 279 (1993); 18 EHRR 79.  
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content of the statements in issue, the fact that the jurors were active members of 
the SAP and that the publisher of the book was owned by the SAP. Because of 
these factors, the jury’s independence and impartiality ‘were open to doubt’32 and Art 
6 had been breached. 
 
Links between a witness and a juror were at issue in Pullar v United Kingdom.33 The 
applicant had been found guilty of corruption on the basis that he had sought money 
to secure planning permission for two men, McLaren and Cormack. Both men gave 
evidence for the prosecution at the applicant’s trial. One of the jurors in the trial was 
employed by McLaren’s firm. A majority of the Strasbourg court found that this did 
not breach the impartiality requirement of Art 6(1). In coming to this conclusion it took 
into account that the juror was a junior employee, had not been involved in the work 
involved in the case and had been made redundant days before the trial. In addition, 
it referred to the fact that the juror was one of 15,34 all of whom had been instructed 
by a judge and taken an oath to act impartially. Four judges dissented in Pullar, 
emphasising that the applicant had been convicted by a majority, not unanimously.  
 
One of the issues raised in Ekeberg v Norway35 was that a juror had given a witness 
statement to the police about the case some years earlier. The matter came to light 
early in the trial and the defence requested that the jury be discharged and a new 
jury empanelled. This solution was not acceded to by the domestic Court, which 
decided that the discharge of the juror involved was sufficient to remedy any 
unfairness. In finding that no breach of Article 6 had occurred on that ground, the 
Strasbourg court emphasised the fact that the length of the trial meant that the jury 
did not deliberate and return its verdict for three weeks after the tainted juror was 
discharged. It also took into account that the statement was deemed not to be 
relevant and was not adduced in evidence, and that the jury were reminded that they 
must act impartially and disregard anything the discharged juror may have said to 
them about her statement. The Court observed that the case was ‘markedly 
                                                          
32
 Ibid. at 96.  
33
 1996-III; 22 EHRR 391.  
34
 The trial took place in Scotland, where the number of jurors is 15. See Duff, ‘The Scottish Criminal 
Jury: A very Peculiar Institution’ in Vidmar (ed), World Jury Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000) 249.    
35
 Applications Nos 11106/04, 11108/04, 11116/04, 11311/04 and 13276/04, Merits, 31 July 2007.  
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weaker’36 than the cases of Pullar, Sander and Gregory, in which the objectionable 
jurors had taken part in the deliberations. However, arguably the appearance of 
impartiality of the jury in Ekeberg was irrevocably tainted. Both the impact of the 
discharged juror on the remaining jurors and on the perception of onlookers was 
unknowable and potentially far-reaching, and should have been treated as a serious 
infraction of trial fairness by the Court.  
 
C. Juror Contact with Third Parties  
 
Inappropriate contacts between jurors and other parties during the trial may taint the 
appearance of the jury’s impartiality. In Hardiman v United Kingdom,37 the European 
Commission on Human Rights declared inadmissible a complaint that a juror invited 
the barrister representing a co-accused of the applicant out for a drink. The applicant 
was unanimously convicted of murder while the co-accused was unanimously 
acquitted. The applicant argued that the juror who sent the note may have influenced 
the verdicts. The Commission observed that the note from the juror was polite, did 
not mention the case and ‘contained no indication that the juror had any difficulty in 
forming a view on the evidence or that she had voted and encouraged others to vote 
in a particular way.’38 The Commission was thus looking for blatant and explicit 
evidence of partiality, when it should have been assessing how the juror’s actions 
appeared from an objective standpoint. It also took into account the unanimity of the 
decision against the applicant and in favour of his co-accused, but those outcomes 
do not of themselves indicate objective impartiality. In subsequent cases with similar 
facts to those in Hardiman the English courts have adopted a similarly laissez-faire 
approach to that of the Commission.39  
 
The vital importance of appropriate investigations into allegations that jurors have 
had inappropriate contact with other parties was emphasised in Farhi v France.40 It 
was alleged that a number of jurors had a short discussion with the prosecution 
                                                          
36
 Ibid. at para 47. 
37
 Application No 25935/94, Admissibility, 28 February 1996.  
38
 Ibid. Paragraph numbers are not provided.  
39
 See, for example, R v Cunningham [2003] EWCA Crim 1769; R v Alexander [2004] EWCA Crim 
2341; R v Cort [2011] EWCA Crim 1597. 
40
 Application No 17070/05, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 16 January 2007.  
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during the trial of the applicant for rape and immigration offences. The applicant 
objected at trial to the interaction involving the jurors and counsel for each side were 
permitted to make representations to a panel of judges investigating the incident. 
The panel found no violation of the French Code of Criminal Procedure. The 
applicant argued that the adversarial panel procedure was ill-suited to investigating 
whether the forbidden contact with jurors had in fact occurred. The Court agreed, 
stating: ‘[O]nly a hearing of the jurors would have been likely to shed any light on the 
nature of the remarks exchanged and the influence they might have had, if any, on 
their opinions.’41 The Court added that the panel’s decision that no irregularity had 
occurred was not accompanied by information supporting that conclusion and thus 
interfered with the applicant’s ability to appeal. In those circumstances, there was a 
breach of Article 6(1). The Court did not address what would have happened if it had 
been verified that the alleged contact had taken place. However, its judgment 
suggests that such a finding would not have caused the automatic abandonment of 
the trial. This can be inferred from the Court’s reference to a proper inquiry 
discovering the content of any exchange and its effect on the jurors. This is in conflict 
with the Court’s consistent emphasis on the importance of objective as well as 
subjective impartiality. The appearance of bias is immediately created once it is 
found that an exchange of this nature has occurred between jurors and a person 
who occupies the partisan position of prosecution counsel. In cases such as this, the 
preservation of public confidence in the criminal process requires the immediate 
cessation of the trial, and a retrial with a different jury. Nor should this principle be 
narrowly construed; the objective impartiality of a decision-maker, whether lay, 
professional or mixed in composition, is destroyed by contact with a party that gives 
the impression that they may favour that party.42 It is difficult to countenance any 
measure which could undo that impression once created.  
 
The European Court of Human Rights was confronted with a juror bias case 
involving a policeman in Szypusz v United Kingdom.43 The applicant was convicted 
of attempted murder after a fight in a street. The prosecution case was heavily reliant 
                                                          
41
 Ibid. at para 29.  
42
 The Court of Appeal did not take this approach on contact between a trial judge and a policeman 
who was a prosecution witness in R v Russell [2006] EWCA Crim 470.  
43
 Application No 8400/07, Merits, 21 September 2010.  
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on CCTV evidence. At trial, this evidence was shown on a machine operated by a 
policeman that permitted advanced viewing, pausing and replaying of the videos. 
When the jury retired to consider its verdict and wanted to see the videos again, the 
Court was cleared and only the jury and the policeman operating the machine were 
present. The applicant argued that the presence of a policeman in this situation 
undermined the impartiality of the jury. The policeman concerned was a member of 
the investigating team involved in the case. He also had given evidence about 
receiving the CCTV tapes and taking a mouth swab of another accused. 
 
The Strasbourg court agreed that the presence of the video operator alone with the 
jury was a cause for concern because of ‘his status as a police officer and his 
resultant association with the prosecution.’44 The Court then looked for the existence 
of other safeguards of impartiality. It identified them in the oaths sworn by the jurors 
and the direction given to them by the judge to try the case on the basis of the 
evidence. Further, specific instructions had been given to the jurors about the 
presence of the policeman; they were only to communicate with him to indicate what 
portions of the CCTV footage they wished to see and were not to deliberate in his 
presence. The officer had also been instructed not to do or say anything except 
show the video segments requested by the jury. Objective bias analysis is almost 
absent from the judgment. The measures relied upon to cure bias were criticised by 
Judge Thór Björgvinsson in his dissenting judgment, with which Judge Garlicki 
concurred. In the view of the former: ‘None of the safeguards relied upon by the 
majority, taken individually or collectively, was sufficient to counterbalance the 
procedural irregularity that occurred.’45 His judgment also emphasises the status of 
the video operator as ‘a member of the police investigation team who was a witness 
for the prosecution’46 and the impression created by the two hours he spent alone 
with the jury, points noticeably underplayed in the majority judgment.  
 
D. Juror Occupation Affecting Impartiality 
 
                                                          
44
 Ibid. at para 82 of the judgment of the majority.  
45
 Ibid. at para 11 of the dissent.  
46
 Ibid. at para 13 of the dissent.  
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The final area of jury trial in which the Strasbourg court’s bias jurisprudence has had 
an effect is that of jury composition. In England and Wales the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 provides that judges, lawyers, the police and employees of the Crown 
Prosecution Service may undertake jury duty.47 The reforms have resulted in a 
steady stream of domestic case-law in which accused persons have argued that 
their trials were unfair because of the presence of persons connected with the 
administration of justice on the juries which convicted them.48  
 
In R v Khan49 the Court of Appeal upheld the appellants’ conviction for conspiracy to 
supply heroin. A juror was a police officer who had worked with one of the police 
witnesses on a different case a couple of years previously. One of the appellants 
gave evidence that he carried a passenger in his car who made incriminating 
comments on a mobile phone belonging to the appellant. The policeman known to 
the juror gave evidence that he had been keeping the appellant under surveillance 
and that the appellant did not have a passenger in the car at the time. The Court of 
Appeal, in line with the decision of the House of Lords in R v Abdroikov,50 held that 
the juror could not be objected to on the basis that he was a policeman. In relation to 
the conflict of evidence, the Court described the evidence of the appellant about the 
existence of a passenger as ‘farcical’51 and his evidence in general as marred by 
‘significant inconsistencies.’52 The Court’s negative view of his testimony appeared to 
inform its conclusion that the reasonable observer would not have been concerned 
by the presence of the police officer on the jury. The applicants took their case to 
Strasbourg where the Court found a breach of Article 6. The basis for that decision 
was stated thus: 
 
[W]here there is an important conflict regarding police evidence in the case 
and a police officer who is personally acquainted with the police officer 
witness giving the relevant evidence is a member of the jury, jury directions 
                                                          
47
 Section 321 and Schedule 33 of the Act, amending the Juries Act 1974.  
48
 See, for example, R v Burdett [2009] EWCA Crim 543; R v Yemoh [2009] EWCA Crim 930; R v Ali 
[2009] EWCA Crim 1763; R v L [2011] EWCA Crim 65. 
49
 [2008] EWCA Crim 1112; [2008] 2 Cr App R 161.  
50
 [2007] UKHL 37; [2007] 1 WLR 2679.  
51
 Ibid. at 174, per Lord Phillips CJ. 
52
 Ibid.  
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and judicial warnings are insufficient to guard against the risk that the juror 
may, albeit subconsciously, favour the evidence of the police.53 
 
One commentator identifies a general unhappiness with the English reforms in the 
judgment, perhaps amounting to an invitation for an applicant to challenge their 
compatibility with Article 6.54 In terms of the effect of the judgment, Ashworth states: 
‘At a minimum, the judge must be informed of the presence of a police officer on the 
jury, and must be able to question that juror in order to ascertain what links there are, 
if any, with officers due to give evidence in the case.’55 
 
3.  Jury secrecy 
  
Until the case of Seckerson v United Kingdom56 the European Court of Human 
Rights had not given detailed consideration to the compatibility of the jury secrecy 
rule with the European Convention on Human Rights. The secrecy rule provides that 
jurors may not divulge the contents of their deliberations at any time, even after the 
conclusion of the trial. It is a long-established common law rule,57 and also has a 
statutory dimension in section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 which makes it 
an offence to ‘obtain, disclose or solicit’ any information pertaining to jury 
deliberations. The Strasbourg court had fleetingly approved of the rule in Gregory. 
Noting that the judge could not ‘question the jurors about the circumstances which 
gave rise to the note’58 because of the secrecy rule,59 the Court observed: ‘[T]he rule 
governing the secrecy of jury deliberations is a crucial and legitimate feature of 
English trial law which serves to reinforce the jury's role as the ultimate arbiter of fact 
and to guarantee open and frank deliberations among jurors on the evidence which 
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they have heard.’60 While the Court resolved the case on a basis other than the 
compatibility of the secrecy rule with the Convention, it clearly indicated that it 
supported its rationale.61 A challenge alleging that section 8 of the Contempt of Court 
Act violated the Convention squarely arose in Seckerson.  
  
In Attorney General v Seckerson62 the foreman of a jury and The Times newspaper 
were prosecuted for breaching section 8. The Times had published the misgivings of 
the foreman about the manslaughter conviction of Keran Henderson, a child-minder 
convicted of killing a baby by shaking. Part of the juror’s concerns related to the way 
in which his fellow jurors had assessed the expert evidence in the case and the role 
that had played in the conviction. He also stated that a vote had been taken early in 
deliberation which revealed a 10:2 split in favour of conviction, after which ‘there was 
no going back.’63 Pill LJ found that ‘general comments on the strength of the 
evidence for the prosecution’64 made by the foreman did not contravene section 8. 
However, his revelations of the votes cast by the jurors and his criticism that they 
reasoned by reference to common sense were clear breaches.  In addition, his other 
comments ‘crossed the line between general comment on the reliability of expert 
evidence...and disclosures of the deliberations of this particular jury in this particular 
case.’65 They thus also amounted to a section 8 contempt. The foreman was fined 
£500 and The Times was fined £15000.  
 
Both parties argued before the European Court of Human Rights that their 
convictions were incompatible with Article 10 of the Convention.66 They contended 
that the reported disclosures related to a matter on which there was public debate 
and concern, namely expert medical evidence. They further argued that the 
restriction entailed by section 8 represented a disproportionate interference with their 
freedom of expression. The Court noted that it was not called upon to decide 
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whether the effect of section 8 in curtailing jury research or the investigation of 
miscarriages of justice was compatible with the Convention. It then justified the 
secrecy rule on a similar basis to the previous domestic decisions: ‘[R]ules imposing 
requirements of confidentiality as regards judicial deliberations play an important role 
in maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary, by promoting free and 
frank discussion by those who are required to decide the issues which arise.’67 It also 
referred to its approval of the secrecy rule in Gregory. The applicants were not 
prohibited by section 8 from contributing to the public debate on expert evidence, 
according to the Court. It held that the finding of contempt and the imposition of fines 
were not disproportionate ‘to the legitimate aim of maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.’68 The Court also took into account that it was necessary 
for penalties imposed for violations of section 8 to have ‘a deterrent effect.’69 
 
In Seckerson the Strasbourg court took a narrow view of the applicants’ argument 
that their disclosure and publication of the information relating to the trial was 
necessary in order for them to contribute to public debate. In effect the Court’s 
decision means that a general discussion of jury-related issues may be held, but it 
may not be informed by evidence from real trials. As was seen above, the Court 
justified this restriction on freedom of expression by invoking the traditional rationales 
for jury secrecy.70 The most intriguing and tantalising aspect of the judgment is the 
statement that the Court was not deciding on issues pertaining to the disclosure of 
deliberation information for research purposes or in order to remedy miscarriages of 
justice. As the Law Commission has noted, this leaves open the possibility that in 
future the Court might find that absolute bans on disclosure in these contexts 
represent violations of the Convention, in particular the right to a fair trial.71 There is 
a particularly compelling case for a finding that English law on the investigation of 
miscarriages of justice is in breach of the Convention. In R v Mirza72 the majority of 
the House of Lords held that allegations of juror misconduct made subsequent to the 
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delivery of the verdict cannot be investigated because the courts are then bound by 
the common law rule of non-disclosure. In a forceful dissent, Lord Steyn 
characterised the majority decision thus: ‘[I]n the interests of maintaining the 
efficiency of the jury system the risk of occasional miscarriages of justice may 
acceptably be tolerated.’73 In an admirably clear passage, he stated: ‘A jury is not 
above the law. As a judicial tribunal it must comply with the requirements of article 
6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights.’74 
 
A future Strasbourg finding that the Mirza rule contravened the Convention would not 
be in conflict with its decision in Seckerson because disclosures by jurors to the 
media are qualitatively different to those which would be made in the course of an 
official investigation into a potentially unfair trial. A climate in which jurors were free 
to speak to the media or disclose deliberation information on the internet would be 
destabilising for the administration of justice, and on that basis the decision in 
Seckerson is unobjectionable. However, the question remains as to whether the 
Strasbourg court will recognise that an iron-clad secrecy rule which prohibits 
research and makes the investigation of jury wrongdoing difficult is inimical to justice 
and at odds with the right to a fair trial.  
 
4. Prejudicial publicity 
 
It has long been accepted that the media has the capacity to imperil the fairness of 
criminal trials, and that this danger is particularly acute in jury trials.75 In the words of 
Sotomayor J in Skilling v United States76: ‘[A]s the tide of public enmity rises, so too 
does the danger that the prejudices of the community will infiltrate the jury.’77 The 
courts in England and Wales rely on the disinfectant effect of judicial directions 
instructing jurors to disregard prejudicial publicity. However, empirical studies have 
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raised questions about the efficacy of such directions.78 The English courts have also 
invoked the so-called ‘fade factor’, in other words that the effect of hostile media 
coverage diminishes over time, as a jury safeguard.79 Prejudicial media coverage 
has not arisen much in Strasbourg case-law. Thus far the Court’s approach in this 
area has been very deferential to domestic courts. 
 
The appellant in R v Abu Hamza80 was the Imam of a mosque and had been 
convicted of soliciting to murder, possession of a document likely to be useful to 
terrorists and offences relating to the stirring up of racial hatred. One of the grounds 
of appeal was that the Crown had delayed in prosecuting him, which in turn had 
permitted prejudicial publicity relating to his trial to flourish. Most of the offences with 
which he was charged were alleged to have occurred between 1997 and 2000. His 
trial took place in 2006. Part of the delay was caused by a stay of the prosecution 
which was granted by the trial judge to allow time to elapse between the trial and the 
London bombings of July 2005. Lord Phillips set down the relevant principles: 
 
It is customary where there has been publicity prejudicial to a defendant that 
may have been seen by members of the jury for the court to proceed on the 
presumption that a jury, if properly directed, will disregard such publicity. Only 
where the effect of the publicity has been so extreme that it is not possible to 
expect the jury to disregard it will it be appropriate to stay a trial on the ground 
of abuse of process.81 
 
Lord Phillips then referred, with approval, to the following statement of Lord Judge in 
In Re Barot,82 another adverse publicity case, where he stated: 
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There is a feature of our trial system which is sometimes overlooked or taken 
for granted….[J]uries up and down the country have a passionate and 
profound belief in, and a commitment to, the right of a defendant to be given a 
fair trial…The integrity of the jury is an essential feature of our trial process. 
Juries follow the directions which the judge will give them to focus exclusively 
on the evidence and to ignore anything they may have heard or read out of 
court…[This is] because the directions themselves will appeal directly to their 
own instinctive and fundamental belief in the need for the trial process to be 
fair.83 
 
Dismissing the appeal, the Court stated that there was no reason to believe that the 
jury had not tried the issues objectively and impartially. His Lordship does not appear 
to have considered that the secrecy rule and the unreasoned nature of the jury 
verdict would render it exceptionally difficult to determine on what basis the jury 
reached its verdict. Lord Phillips also referred to the fact that the jury had acquitted 
the applicant on some charges as providing evidence of the impartiality with which 
the jurors approached their task. This reasoning has been resorted to in English 
apprehended bias case-law84 and has been subject to criticism.85 Acquittal on some 
counts does not indicate that counts on which the jury convicted were the product of 
conscientious or impartial decision making. 
 
The applicant appealed the Court of Appeal decision to the European Court of 
Human Rights, arguing that the publicity which attended his trial violated his right to 
a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention. The Court was acutely conscious of the 
need to avoid reaching a decision which would mean that ‘the greater the notoriety of 
a crime, the less likely that its perpetrators will be tried and convicted.’86 It 
emphasised that it would determine compliance with Article 6 in the realm of adverse 
publicity by investigating ‘whether there are sufficient safeguards to ensure that the 
proceedings as a whole are fair.’87 Judicial direction was the main safeguard 
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identified by the Court: ‘[I]n the majority of cases the nature of the trial process and, 
in particular, the role of the trial judge in directing the jury will ensure that the 
proceedings are fair.’88 It recognised that in some exceptional cases adverse 
publicity would be such that a stay of proceedings would be required, but said 
domestic courts were better placed to make this determination. However, the Court 
found that in this case the directions to disregard given by the trial judge constituted 
sufficient safeguards to uphold the right to a fair trial.  
 
The judgment is very deferential to the findings and approach of the domestic court, 
even echoing that acquittals on certain charges reflected well on the integrity of the 
jury’s verdict. One can appreciate the concern voiced by the Court that a more 
stringent approach to prejudicial publicity might mean that the more heinous the 
crime the less chance it would get to trial. However, that is a separate issue to the 
question of whether directions to disregard are an effective safeguard. 
 
In the subsequent case of Beggs v United Kingdom89 the Court emphasised the 
mitigating effect of a lapse of time of almost two years between ‘a virulent and 
prejudicial press and media campaign’90 against the applicant and the date of his 
trial. The Court also took into account that although some of the material from this 
campaign was available on the internet, it could not be found by simply entering the 
applicant’s name in a general search engine, and would instead have required a 
search of specific online newspaper archives. The implication that more easily 
accessible internet content might raise a Convention issue will no doubt be invoked 
in future cases, and it will be interesting to see how the Court engages with such 
arguments.  
 
5. The unreasoned verdict  
 
The compatibility with the Convention of jury verdicts unaccompanied by reasons 
(referred to as ‘unreasoned verdicts’ for the sake of brevity) was queried by 
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commentators and advocates over a number of years.91 In Saric v Denmark92 the 
Second Section tersely dismissed the applicant’s argument that an unexplained 
verdict violated Article 6, stating: 'The absence of reasons in the High Court’s 
judgment was due to the fact that the applicant’s guilt was determined by a jury, 
something which cannot in itself be considered contrary to the Convention.’93 
Similarly, in Papon v France,94 the Court held that the duty to give reasons had to be 
read subject to ‘any unusual procedural features,’95 including the fact that jurors do 
not give reasons. As discussed earlier, the Strasbourg court referred approvingly to 
the secrecy rule, which is strongly linked with the absence of reasons, in the case of 
Gregory. The case of Taxquet v Belgium96, which will now be discussed, represented 
a break with the previous case-law of the Commission and the Court. 
 
The applicant in Taxquet was charged with the 1991 murder of an honorary 
government minister, André Cools, and the attempted murder of his partner. Taxquet 
was tried before the Liège Assize Court and was one of eight co-accused. After 
listening to witness depositions and the submissions of the prosecutor and the 
defence, four questions relating to Mr Taxquet were put to the twelve person jury by 
the presiding judge. The first question asked if the applicant was guilty of the 
intentional homicide of Mr Cools, enumerating alternative types of involvement 
(committing the crime, assisting in its perpetration or inciting others to commit it) 
which would constitute the offence. The second question asked if the offence 
referred to in the first question was premeditated. The third and fourth questions 
asked if the applicant was guilty of the attempted intentional homicide of Mr Cools’ 
partner, and if that offence was premeditated. The jury replied in the affirmative to all 
four questions and, as was then the practice in Belgium, did not disclose their 
grounds for so doing. Having failed in an appeal to the Court of Cassation, the 
applicant initiated a case before the Strasbourg court. One of his arguments was that 
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the failure of the jury which convicted him to provide reasons explaining its decision 
was in breach of Article 6.  
 
In defence of its mode of trial, the Belgian Government relied on cases such as 
Zarouali v Belgium,97 from which the unreasoned verdict had emerged unscathed. 
There the Commission had emphasised the role played by the questions put to the 
jury in providing a framework for the verdict. However, in Taxquet, the Court referred 
to ‘a perceptible change’98 both in its own case-law and in the legislation of the 
Contracting States, since that judgment had been given. In relation to the latter, the 
Court elaborated: ‘[C]ertain States, such as France, have made provision... for the 
publication of a statement of reasons in assize court decisions.’99 
 
The general position on the provision of reasons is clearly stated in the decision: ‘In 
its case-law the Court has frequently held that the reasoning provided in court 
decisions is closely linked to the concern to ensure a fair trial as it allows the rights of 
the defence to be preserved. Such reasoning is essential to the very quality of justice 
and provides a safeguard against arbitrariness.’100 The court stated that the provision 
of reasons is more important at first instance than on appeal, and that this is 
particularly so in respect of criminal matters. This corresponds with one of the main 
rationales for the duty to give reasons,101 namely the idea of enabling the person 
affected either to accept the decision or to consider an appeal. 
 
The Court in Taxquet noted that the same questions had been put to the jury in 
relation to each of the eight co-accused. The failure to tailor such questions to the 
situation of each individual had been held to violate Article 6 in a previous case.102 
However, the Court identified a further problem with the procedure in the case before 
it. In a strongly-worded passage it condemned the one-word answers yielded by the 
questions: 
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The Court considers that such laconic answers to vague and general 
questions could have left the applicant with an impression of arbitrary justice 
lacking in transparency. Not having been given so much as a summary of the 
main reasons why the Assize Court was satisfied that he was guilty, he was 
unable to understand – and therefore to accept – the court's decision.103 
 
The Court referred to the importance of reasoned verdicts for a number of 
stakeholders in the criminal process, namely the person being tried, the appellate 
courts and the public at large. The provision of reasons was perceived as vital, not 
only for the accused but also for the maintenance of confidence in the administration 
of justice: 
 
It is...important, for the purpose of explaining the verdict both to the accused 
and to the public at large – the ‘people’ in whose name the decision is given – 
to highlight the considerations that have persuaded the jury of the accused's 
guilt or innocence and to indicate the precise reasons why each of the 
questions has been answered in the affirmative or the negative.104 
 
Significantly, the court added that the absence of such reasons meant that the Court 
of Cassation was unable to conduct ‘an effective review,’105 including the 
identification of ‘any insufficiency or inconsistency in the reasoning.’106 The court 
concluded that the fair trial rights of the applicant under Article 6(1) had been 
breached.   
 
Daly notes that the Court’s departure from its previous case-law was ‘indicated 
with...brevity.’107 Given its potential for far-reaching changes to criminal procedure in 
many countries, the tone of the judgment is surprisingly low-key and its lack of detail 
striking. However, although the reasoning in the judgment of the Second Section 
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was brief, it was unambiguous. The only reasonable interpretation of the decision 
was that it required ‘juries in all contracting parties to the Convention...to provide a 
reasoned basis for their verdicts.’108 Writing extra-judicially, the then Chief Justice of 
Ireland criticised ‘the opacity of the court’s reasoning’109 and its ‘inadequate 
analysis’110 of the issues. In addition, he took issue with what he perceived to be the 
court’s reliance on an emerging consensus that juries should provide reasons. While 
the court referred to a trend to that effect among the contracting States, it might be 
overstating it to describe that as the identification of a consensus.  It emerged 
subsequently that the Court’s reference to a French reform which mandated 
reasoned jury verdicts was misleading, because although such a reform had been 
proposed in a Bill, it was never enacted.111 However, it is important to note that the 
judgment did not say that Belgium was out of line with the dominant practice among 
the parties to the Convention.  The mistake in relation to French practice, while 
regrettable, does not fatally undermine the reasoning of the court. The true kernel of 
the court’s reasoning was present in its normative statements about the importance 
of openness, accountability and clarity. 
 
In terms of the ramifications of the decision, the then Chief Justice of Ireland 
observed that it could give rise to ‘profound implications for juries across Europe.’112 
An English commentator wrote that ‘judicial nails were...bitten to the quick’113 in its 
aftermath. An Irish Times headline proclaimed: ‘Court ruling could lead to end of jury 
trial system.’114 Daly considered potential reforms of the Irish jury system to ensure 
compatibility with the Convention, including the giving of reasons, the adoption of the 
mixed jury system and the abolition of jury trial altogether.115 The Belgian 
Government requested that Taxquet be referred to the Grand Chamber, and Daly 
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noted the potential for its decision to ‘foist fundamental and far-reaching...reform’116 
on the jury systems of the States subject to the Convention.  
 
Prior to considering the decision of the Grand Chamber, it should be noted that 
Belgium changed its domestic law in the aftermath of the Second Section decision. 
Under the reform the presiding judge helps the jury to set out the main reasons for its 
decision.117 Permission to make submissions before the Grand Chamber was given 
to Ireland, the United Kingdom and France. As Roberts has noted, those countries 
had a greater interest in the outcome than Belgium, given the reform that had 
already been effected in that jurisdiction.118 
 
Before the Grand Chamber, the United Kingdom submitted that a margin of 
appreciation applied in relation to the procedures used to provide a fair trial. Both 
Ireland and the UK emphasised the potential for the judge’s summing up to provide a 
‘chain of reasoning’119 for the deliberating jury. The language employed by the Irish 
Government in its submission has been described as ‘florid.’120 In a rather laughable 
passage the Government stated: ‘There has never been a complaint that the system 
lacks transparency.’121 Even the most ardent supporter of jury trial could not claim 
that it involves open or publicly-explained decision-making. On the contrary, the 
secrecy rule and the unreasoned verdict ensure the opacity of its internal processes. 
The Irish Government emphasised that the secrecy of deliberations was contingent 
on the absence of reasons, but made no effort to explain why absolute secrecy was 
desirable or necessary.122 Deploying the oft-used argument about ending total 
secrecy, Ireland argued that a requirement of a reasoned verdict would ‘undermine 
the whole essence of a trial by jury.’123 In relation to this tired and illogical point, 
McHugh had observed years before: ‘[P]ublic confidence in the jury system will be 
undermined by more being known about jury deliberations only if the system 
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deserves to be undermined.’124  In outlining the raison d’être of the jury, the Irish 
Government stated: ‘The essential feature of a jury trial is to interpose, between the 
accused and the prosecution, people who will bring their experience and 
commonsense to bear on resolving the issue of the guilt or innocence of the 
accused.’125 However, its submission failed to explain how that crucial aspect of the 
jury would be compromised by the provision of reasons. For its part, France stressed 
the diversity of trial processes among the Contracting States, and urged the Court 
not to impose uniform rules upon them.126 
 
The Grand Chamber acknowledged the diverse range of criminal trial methods 
among the member states of the Council of Europe, referring to those which had no 
jury system (14), those with a collaborative jury (24) and those with an entirely lay 
jury system (10).127 The Court further noted the diversity of practice within those 
countries with the latter system, referring to disparities in relation to the numbers of 
jurors and whether or not a judge summed up or presented the jury with a list of 
questions. The Court stated that the Contracting States were free to choose their 
systems of criminal trial, provided they were in compliance with the Convention.  
 
The Grand Chamber reviewed the case-law prior to the decision of the Second 
Section. In a critical passage, it stated: ‘It follows from the case-law cited above that 
the Convention does not require jurors to give reasons for their decision and that 
Article 6 does not preclude a defendant from being tried by a lay jury even where 
reasons are not given for the verdict.’128 It is thus clear that unreasoned jury verdicts 
are not automatically contrary to the Convention. The Court continued: 
‘Nevertheless, for the requirements of a fair trial to be satisfied, the accused, and 
indeed the public, must be able to understand the verdict that has been given; this is 
a vital safeguard against arbitrariness.’129 The Court advocated that all aspects of a 
procedure should be analysed to determine if it complies with Article 6. In conducting 
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this analysis in the case before it, the Court identified its task as determining whether 
‘the proceedings afforded sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness and made it 
possible for the accused to understand why he was found guilty.’130 The Court thus 
appeared to be placing a high value on transparency, albeit in a context where it had 
said that this did not have to be achieved by a reasoned verdict. The safeguards 
enumerated by the court as alternatives to a reasoned verdict were judicial summing 
up, ‘unequivocal questions put to the jury by the judge, forming a framework on 
which the verdict is based’131 and appellate remedies. On the facts, the court found 
that Belgium was in breach of Art 6 because the questions put to the jury by the 
judge did not sufficiently differentiate between the applicant and his co-accused. 
 
The judgment of the Grand Chamber is disappointing. It purports to emphasise the 
importance of transparency in criminal justice decision-making but engages in 
sophistry by presenting processes such as summing up as accountability 
safeguards. Judicial directions to a jury play an important role in a trial on indictment, 
but they do not enlighten the public, the accused or appeal courts as to why a 
particular accused was convicted.132 It is disingenuous to pretend that they do so. 
Spencer argues that reasoned verdicts are particularly important for innocent 
defendants, and that guilty ones will be the only beneficiaries of the Grand Chamber 
judgment.133 Presumably this is because the traditional verdict may mask 
unmeritorious acquittals and the conviction of the innocent. The Grand Chamber 
wore kid gloves when it engaged with the issue of the unreasoned verdict, 
apparently reluctant to do anything which would remould domestic trial procedures of 
long standing. When one considers the strong arguments made by the Second 
Section for greater clarity and the advantages of accountability more generally, the 
Grand Chamber’s approach is difficult to defend. As Roberts has noted: ‘The 
European Court of Human Rights cannot afford to be so respectful of, or hidebound 
by, states parties’ procedural traditions.’134 Given the Court’s mandate in 
standardising human rights compliance among the Contracting States, its deferential 
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attitude, and consequent illogical reasoning in relation to transparency safeguards, is 
noteworthy. The Court has shown no such timidity in confronting highly contentious 
procedural issues on previous occasions. Examples include the Court’s finding that 
detained suspected terrorists are entitled to information enabling them to refute the 
allegations against them135 and its ruling that the procedures used in the trial of the 
killers of James Bulger were not sufficiently tailored to their age and were thus in 
violation of their rights.136 Yet when faced with the jury, a legal institution weighed 
down by national identity, culture and history, the Court faltered.  
 
Speaking extra-judicially on the day on which the Grand Chamber judgment was 
handed down, Lord Judge stated with evident satisfaction: 
 
My immediate impression is that the Grand Chamber has understood the 
essential features of the jury system as it operates in our jurisdiction and, for 
that matter, in the Republic...What seems to me to be clear from the judgment 
is that a properly structured summing up followed by a verdict of the jury, 
which is confined to the verdict, provides an ample understanding to the 
defendant, and the public, of the reasons why the jury decided that the case 
against the defendant has been proved. 137 
 
It is unclear from Taxquet, however, whether a comprehensive summing up alone 
will satisfy the accountability requirements of Article 6, or whether the other 
safeguards mentioned, including appellate remedies, will also be scrutinised. 
Ashworth points to the use of the word ‘and’ rather than ‘or’ by the Grand Chamber 
when listing the safeguards of judicial directions and unequivocal questions.138 
However, he concludes the Grand Chamber did not intend to ‘overthrow the British 
system by a side-wind.’139 Duff, writing from a Scottish perspective, argues that 
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‘relatively full’140 judicial directions will need to be accompanied by a greater 
willingness to allow appeals on the basis of verdict perversity.141 In relation to 
England, Roberts states that the Court of Appeal is often perceived as approaching 
jury verdicts with undue deference.142 The reluctance of the Irish courts to intervene 
on the basis of verdict perversity has also been noted.143  Nevertheless, the appeal 
mechanisms against jury verdicts found in Ireland and the United Kingdom are more 
extensive than those found in Belgium, where as the Grand Chamber noted in 
Taxquet, an appeal can only be made on a point of law.144 It is probable that a 
system of summing up, combined with the avenues of appeal available to persons 
convicted by a jury in Ireland and the United Kingdom, are sufficient to ensure 
compliance with the Grand Chamber judgment.  
 
The fact that the traditional common law jury will not be forced into transparency by 
Taxquet – obvious from the Grand Chamber decision itself – was reinforced in Judge 
v United Kingdom.145 There the Strasbourg court refused to admit a case challenging 
the unreasoned verdict of a Scottish jury, citing the ‘framework’ which is in place to 
guide the jury, including counsels’ arguments and the judge’s charge. The Scottish 
appellate system, which looks at whether a jury verdict is logically inconsistent or 
irrational, was also approved as a safeguard against arbitrariness. 
 
6. Caution, the jury and the potential for controversy 
 
The dominant characteristic of the cases analysed in this article is restraint. The 
European Court of Human Rights has avoided making any finding which would 
interfere with or challenge core characteristics of jury trial. It came closest to doing 
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so in Taxquet, but ultimately engaged in a poorly-reasoned retreat from its initial 
position. Decisions such as Sander and Hanif and Khan are examples of instances 
in which the Court has found that jury trial procedures were in breach of the 
Convention, but the defects in issue did not concern fundamental aspects of the jury 
system. Strasbourg may well be influenced by policy concerns in this area, where 
the potential to enrage the United Kingdom by interfering with an institution regarded 
as quintessentially British,146 is considerable. 
 
It is true, however, that the European Court has not been chary about making 
decisions which have provoked outrage from British politicians and media 
commentators in recent years. The popular press is openly hostile to the Court and 
its decisions147 and media reporting on them is often inaccurate.148 Cases in which 
the Court has held that prisoners have a right to vote149 and that a notorious 
terrorism suspect could not be deported because of the risk that evidence extracted 
by torture would be used at his trial in Jordan150 are among those which have 
precipitated calls for a re-evaluation of Britain’s relationship with the Court and 
indeed its total withdrawal from the Convention. In R v Horncastle151 the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court trenchantly rejected criticisms of the law of hearsay in 
England and Wales which the Strasbourg court had made in Al-Khawaja v United 
Kingdom.152 This tense exchange was attenuated, at least in part, by the subsequent 
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decision of the Grand Chamber in Al-Khawaja.153 The Supreme Court has 
subsequently indicated that it will only depart from Grand Chamber decisions in 
exceptional circumstances, particularly where there is more than one Grand 
Chamber decision to the same effect.154 
 
The former British President of the European Court of Human Rights, Sir Nicholas 
Bratza, has referred to ‘a crescendo of criticism’155 of the Court in his home country. 
While the hostility has become more marked under the Conservative/Liberal 
Democrat coalition government, the Court’s judgments were sometimes disparaged 
under the previous Labour administration also.156 In this febrile atmosphere 
academics and judges have entered the fray to contribute to the discourse on the 
role of the Convention and its Court in British law.157 In December 2012 the 
Conservative MP Richard Bacon introduced the Human Rights Act 1998 (Repeal) 
Bill in the House of Commons. Although ultimately defeated, seventy-one 
Conservative MPs supported the Bill. One might invoke the increasingly fraught 
relationship between the United Kingdom and Strasbourg as evidence that the 
European Court does not take into account the potential for political backlash when 
determining the cases which come before it. However, the Court’s decisions in 
relation to core aspects of the jury system have always been characterised by an 
unusual degree of reticence. This may be contrasted with its more robust approach 
to other questions and suggests that it is influenced by the possible official or public 
reactions which would greet closer scrutiny of jury trial. Indeed, Fenwick argues that 
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the hostile reaction which some of the Court’s decisions have engendered in recent 
years is beginning to affect its jurisprudence by causing it to become less 
interventionist generally.158 The threat of UK withdrawal from the Convention is an 
important background factor.159 While the Court may have been taken aback by the 
depth of media and political criticism of some of its judgments, it appears to have a 
long-standing awareness of the uproar which might be occasioned by condemning 
the essential attributes of jury trial. The jury exercises a deep-seated and emotive 
hold over the British imagination, and has long done so. In 1844 it was said that one 
would have difficulty getting ‘the British bosom into a sufficiently tranquil state to 
discuss this great subject,’160 while in 1979 the discourse on jury trial was 
condemned as ‘hysterical’161 and ‘bitter.’162 A court popularly regarded as ‘foreign’ 
would be ill-advised to fatally condemn an institution so singularly associated with a 
nation’s history and identity. In the words of Zander: ‘There is no institution that more 
expresses the philosophy of the English justice system than the jury.’163 The extent 
to which the jury retains its mesmeric appeal may be seen in the discourse on 
whether there should be a United Kingdom Bill of Rights.164  
 
The fact that jury trial is not protected in the Convention has been called in aid by 
some, notably the Conservative Party, as a reason for the enactment of a Bill to 
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protect British rights. In a 2006 speech the current Prime Minister described the lack 
of protection given to the jury system in the Human Rights Act 1998 as one of its 
failures.165 In 2008 the parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights published a 
report advocating the creation of a Bill of Rights.166 In relation to the question of 
whether jury trial should be included in the document, the Committee recognised that 
the value and status of this mode of trial divided opinion. It concluded in favour of a 
compromise provision which would protect a right to jury trial in serious cases, but 
would be subject to ‘demonstrably justifiable restrictions.’167 By contrast, a Green 
Paper published by the Labour Government in 2009 to initiate discussion about a Bill 
of Rights did not favour the inclusion of a guarantee relating to jury trial. It noted that 
while it was ‘deeply entrenched’168 as the means by which serious crime is tried in 
the United Kingdom, it was by no means perfect. In support of this contention it 
raised the question of its suitability in complex cases and the unreasoned nature of 
its decisions.169 More recently, this issue has arisen in the context of the publications 
of the United Kingdom Commission on a Bill of Rights. The Commission was 
established in March 2011 to assess if a United Kingdom bill of rights should be 
created. Part of its work involved consideration of the types of rights and guarantees 
such an instrument would protect. The Law Society of England and Wales was 
among 40 respondents to the Commission’s consultation process who argued that a 
right to jury trial should be included in any United Kingdom Bill of Rights.170 In its 
Consultation Paper the Commission was mindful of the complexities of formulating a 
guarantee relating to jury trial which would fit easily into the three separate 
jurisdictions of the United Kingdom.171 Like the 2009 Green Paper, it also referred to 
the possibility that jury trial might not be the best mode of trial, and mentioned the 
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unreasoned verdict and complex cases in this regard.172 Ultimately the 
Commission’s conclusions focussed on the broad issue of whether the United 
Kingdom should adopt a Bill of Rights rather than on the content of any such 
document.173 However, its publications confirm O’Cinneide’s observation that jury 
trial is one of the perceived ‘“native” rights’174, the Convention’s omission of which is 
seized upon by British critics as evidence of its flawed priorities. The Strasbourg 
court is no doubt aware of this context when deciding on jury-related cases, and it 
would be surprising if it did not sometimes influence decisions, such as the volte face 
of the Grand Chamber from the Second Section decision in Taxquet.  
 
A decision heralding significant changes to jury trial could encounter a less than 
enthusiastic welcome in any of the Contracting States to the Convention which uses 
such a mode of trial.175 However, the United Kingdom response would undoubtedly 
be hostile in the extreme, both because of the prevailing anti-Strasbourg feeling, and 
the ingrained sense of the jury as a “distinctively British”176 institution. This 
background should not inform decisions of the Court, but arguably has done so. 
Proponents of jury trial sometimes regard it as immutable, whereas it has evolved 
and changed throughout its long history. It has changed from an all-male group of 
property owners who had to reach a unanimous verdict in order to convict to an 
institution which should be representative of the community and may bring in a 
majority verdict of guilty. It can evolve in the future in order to accommodate 
developing human rights standards. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
This article has endeavoured to provide a comprehensive analysis of the impact of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted by the European Court of 
Human Rights, on the institution of trial by jury. It has been argued that although the 
Convention has had an influence on the conduct of jury trials, particularly on certain 
issues affecting juror impartiality, it has not fundamentally changed the essence of 
the common law jury. The secrecy rule and the publicly unreasoned verdict remain 
intact, in spite of pressing human rights arguments in favour of their amendment. It 
was suggested that non-legal considerations may underlie the Strasbourg court’s 
reluctance to intervene forcefully in such areas. The cultural and emotional 
attachment to traditional conceptions of jury trial in the United Kingdom, viewed 
against the backdrop of anti-Convention sentiment in that jurisdiction, is an important 
lens through which to analyse the caution of the Court in this sphere.  
 
Insufficient weight has been accorded by the European Court to the rights of persons 
tried by jury. Both the Court and the Contracting States need to realise that 
traditional attributes of jury trial can be amended without denuding the institution of 
its main feature, namely the involvement of lay people in the administration of justice. 
If this principle were accepted, decisions necessitating changes to established 
practices could be accommodated within the jury system, instead of being viewed as 
threatening assaults on national customs and traditions. A less deferential approach 
is required by the Court, unhindered by political or diplomatic concerns. There must 
be recognition of the fact that jury trial, like all human processes, contains the 
potential for injustice and abuse.   
 
 
